Policy Paper 1: Overcoming alienation: Kaliningrad as a Russian enclave inside the European Union by Gromadzki, Grzegorz
 1. 
Overcoming Alienation: 
Kaliningrad  
as a Russian Enclave  
inside the European Union 
 
 
Overcoming Alienation: Kaliningrad as a Russian Enclave inside the European Union Warsaw, January 2001  
 2 
 
 
 
Written by: 
Grzegorz Gromadzki 
Andrzej Wilk 
 
Assistant writers: 
Tadeusz Chabiera 
Bartosz Cichocki 
Piotr Kosiewski 
Agnieszka Magdziak-Miszewska 
Jan Puchalski 
Mariusz Jan Radło 
Robert Traba 
Marcin Wojciechowski 
Adam Zieliński 
 
 
 
Editor: 
Jakub Boratyński 
Katarzyna Morawska 
 
Translation: 
Witold Czartoryski 
 
Typesetting: 
Michał Poloński 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Publisher: 
 
 
 
ul. Sapieżyńska 10 a, 00-215 Warsaw, Poland 
tel. (48-22) 536 02 00, fax 536 02 20 
e-mail: europa@batory.org.pl 
www.batory.org.pl 
 
 
This publication is distributed free of charge. 
This publication is also available in Polish and Russian. 
Overcoming Alienation: Kaliningrad as a Russian Enclave inside the European Union Warsaw, January 2001  
 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This report is the first of a series of papers which are planned to present the viewpoints of the 
Polish non-governmental community regarding important European-Integration-related 
international issues.  
 
The project was initiated by the Stefan Batory Foundation and we are inviting various NGOs 
to work alongside us in the preparation of subsequent reports.  
The text presented herein was prepared jointly with the Centre for International Relations and 
the "Borussia" Culture Society. Independent experts have also been involved in various works 
leading to this report.  
We would like to express a warm thank you to everyone involved in this project for their kind 
help and valuable comments.  
 
In keeping with the formula for policy papers, we would like to talk about those issues 
affecting the future of Europe in a manner understandable to the Western reader. We would 
also like to further encourage discussion on such matters in Poland.  
It is not intended to merely present Polish viewpoints and Polish concerns. It is vital for the 
papers to offer a pan-European perspective and constitute a material input to the debate on 
what the external policy of the EU should be.  
 
We believe that NGOs may play an important role in the discussion. Their hands are not tied 
by the numerous restrictions associated with the current political state of affairs and the 
ongoing delicate negotiations with the EU. It also appears that the opinions of Polish NGOs 
may turn out to be interesting, for we certainly perceive many issues from a perspective quite 
different to that of current EU member states.  
 
 
We wish you a pleasant read and welcome any subsequent discussion.  
 
       Stefan Batory Foundation 
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ne of the important challenges to an enlarged European Union, comprising both Lithuania and Poland, 
will concern relations with the Kaliningrad, which will become a Russian enclave surrounded by 
territories belonging to the European Union. Discussions on the future of Kaliningrad as an enclave 
inside the Union are currently taking place both in the EU and in Russia. However, only preliminary 
drafts for conceivable solutions have thus far been presented. 
As immediate neighbours of the Kaliningrad, Lithuania and Poland are also participating in 
the discussion. 
The present report, published by the Polish NGO community, is a contribution to the ongoing 
European debate as to the nature of future relations between the European Union and the 
Kaliningrad. Although we include in it the experiences drawn from the fact of Poland being in 
direct neighbourhood, the basic approach of the actions that we propose to be taken 
encompasses the perspectives and interests of Europe as a whole . 
The issue of the orientation of the development of EU-Kaliningrad relations needs to be 
resolved within the next few years, so as to ensure that along with Polish and Lithuanian 
accessions to the European Union there should be no sudden deterioration in the relations of 
the said with the outside world. 
 
I. The Situation of the Kaliningrad  
1. The Region’s Society and distinguishing features 
For the community inhabiting the Kaliningrad one of the most important changes to take 
place after the disintegration of the USSR involved the process which may be loosely 
described as the “phenomenon of the opening”. After years of total isolation during the cold 
war period, when there was entirely out-of-bounds to foreigners, the world started opening up. 
In the early 1990s contact with immediate neighbours began: with Poland, and also Lithuania, 
which subsequent to its proclamation of independence became a foreign country for the 
inhabitants of Kaliningrad. Travel to those countries was facilitated by arrangements allowing 
for border crossings without the need for visas. At that juncture, the process of constructing 
ties with hitherto “eternal enemies” such as Germany or the Scandinavian countries became 
more natural. 
This embodied a certain paradox. On the one hand, the new political situation in Europe 
had led to the isolation of Kaliningrad from its mother country, whilst on the other hand 
it facilitated greater contact with the outside world. It turned out that the case of the 
enclave presented both a handicap to and an opportunity for the region. 
In the eyes of Kaliningrad’s inhabitants and Russians from other parts of the Russian 
Federation the new situation was perceived, above all, as an opportunity. This is backed up by 
data on migration behaviour. During the past decade more people have moved to the enclave 
than have migrated away from it. This positive influx has compensated for natural population 
decline due to a negative birth rate, so the number of inhabitants continues to hover around 
the figure of 950,000. It is interesting to note that the phenomenon of a spontaneous positive 
migration balance runs contrary to the opinion, popular among the Moscow elite, that 
Kaliningrad is a region, which like other Russian regions would have limited opportunities for 
development.  
O 
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Recent years have witnessed the gradual emergence and formation of a regional identity 
among enclave inhabitants. It is clearly not a matter of forming a “Kaliningrad 
nationality”, but rather the recognition of their own particularity within a greater 
Russia. 
This phenomenon is particularly interesting due to the fact that the entire Kaliningrad population consists of 
immigrants who settled there after the Second World War, i.e. under USSR administration. Owing to national 
diversity, the population at that time was characterised, above all, by a Soviet rather than Russian identity. 
Identification with the Soviet Union was made more obvious by the fact that Kaliningrad was a militarised zone. 
At present, strong pro-USSR sentiments are visible there among older generations. The middle-aged and 
younger generations are to a large degree more accepting of the new realities. 
The same applies to the majority of Kaliningrad’s political and economic elite, which came to 
power following the most recent elections of Kaliningrad governor, and to the Duma 
[assembly of deputies]. This elite understands the specific character of its place of residence 
and for that reason it is also interested in improving ties with Kalingrad's immediate 
neighbours, as well as with the EU. 
 
2. Military Potential of Kaliningrad 
The Formation of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in the Kaliningrad has 
undergone a thorough restructuring process during the past few years. The Baltic Fleet, which 
has come to include all the units stationed in Kaliningrad, currently belongs to the best 
operational forces of the Russian army in terms of organisation and training. It is probably the 
only structure of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation at that level, which has adapted 
to the new geopolitical and economic situation of Russia. This success can be directly 
attributed to the commander of the Fleet for many years, Admiral Vladimir Yegorov, 
currently governor of Kaliningrad. The capacity of the Fleet has been maintained at the same 
level for a number of years, a level unlikely to change over the next few years. According to 
Admiral Yegorov, Russia is currently uninterested in developing its armed forces in the, 
"neither from an economic, nor a military point of view”. Numbers in the Armed Forces of 
the Russian Federation in the Kaliningrad do not exceed 25,000 (both officers and soldiers). 
The navy and air force of the Baltic Fleet constitute a small team (in fact the fleet has been 
reduced to the size of a Flotilla, the nomenclature being upheld merely for reasons of 
prestige), nonetheless maintaining outstanding tactical values. The core of the Fleet consists 
of small missile units intended for submarine and minesweeper combat. Large surface vessels 
and submarines serve above all as targets during exercises. The ships are relatively new by 
Russian standards. Approximately 70% of them have been in service for less than 15 years. 
The state of the Fleet's air force is comparable. 
The profile of the marine component of the Baltic Fleet, after the changes in the second 
half of the nineties, is typically defensive (following the withdrawal of most of the larger 
ships, the idea of an attack on the Danish straits has been abandoned). The nature of the 
exercises conducted leads to the hypothesis that in the event of a possible conflict, the 
objective of the Fleet would be to paralyse Baltic Sea navigation.   
The land units of the Baltic Fleet are either undermanned or staffed insufficiently. Close to 
half of the brigades and regiments of the different armed services function as Bases for the 
Storage of Arms and Military Equipment. Owing to the necessity to replenish the staff levels, 
land forces would be unable to launch any operation before first effecting a mobilisation. 
Recent public opinion has been concerned by reports on the locating of nuclear warheads on 
Kaliningrad territory. It should be remembered that small depots of artillery nuclear devices 
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from the 1950s and tactical nuclear warheads for SCUD launchers have probably existed for 
many years in the region. In spite of Russian démenti it cannot be unequivocally confirmed 
whether any recent locating of new tactical nuclear arms has indeed taken place or not. The 
transportation of such arms would have certainly precipitated a deterioration in the 
international political climate, including relations between the EU and Russia. 
 
Apart from the units of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other units of so-called 
military forces are stationed in the area: the Frontier Troops of Border Guard Services of the 
Russian Federation (some 5 thousand) and Internal Forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
of the Russian Federation (approximately 1 thousand). Current Russian military potential in 
the Kaliningrad should be seen vis-a-vis the operational capacity of the region. What justifies 
the permanent presence in Baltijsk – the sea base of the Baltic Fleet in Kaliningrad – of some 
70% of the Baltic Fleet, is the fact that this harbour is the only Russian port on the Baltic that 
does not freeze in winter. 
The retiring personnel of the Baltic Fleet remains, as a rule, in the Kaliningrad. Its functioning 
centres around business activities conducted at the interface between local administration, the 
military and the so-called shadow economy. A part of the military starts to become active in 
business whilst still in service. This especially involves logistics officers. The decision of 
former military staff to remain in Kaliningrad and the orientation of their activities as civilians 
is largely influenced by the particular standing of the military therein. In proportion to the 
general estimate of 950 thousand inhabitants of Kaliningrad, the economic significance of the 
Baltic Fleet cannot be overestimated. It generates huge purchasing power potential in 
Kaliningrad, and creates in its surrounding area jobs that are relatively stable, according to 
local conditions. 
 
3. The Basic Problem – the Lack of a Clear Central Policy for Kaliningrad 
The absence of a clearly defined policy from Moscow with respect to Kaliningrad has been 
evident throughout the past decade. This lack of central policy was one of the important 
causes behind the inability to turn Kaliningrad into a well prospering economic area. Frequent 
changes in customs and tax regulations led to the fiasco of such ventures as the Free 
Economic Zone “Yantar” established in 1991, and its successor Special Economic Zone in 
1996. In the coming years one should not expect changes which would enable business 
activities to be conducted in accordance with EU standards, either in Russia or  Kaliningrad, . 
In various studies and reports it has been fashionable to articulate a future for the 
Kaliningrad on the basis of choosing between two alternatives; either a military base, or 
a very well prospering economic zone. The experiences of the 1990s however show that 
this would be an inappropriate model.  Contemporary Russia will choose neither 
scenario.  It should rather be expected that central policy vis-à-vis Kaliningrad will 
remain vague, although probably with a tendency toward exercising greater control at 
the centre. 
A meeting of the Russian government concerning the issue of the Kaliningrad is anticipated in 
the first quarter of the year 2001. Although supposed to be devoted to, among other things, 
international relations, the special zone, the Baltic Fleet, energy and telecommunications, it 
will probably not bring about any penetrating changes to existing practices. 
Moscow-Kaliningrad relations need to be perceived in the wider context of Russia as a whole. 
The centrist tendencies of President Vladimir Putin which far outperform those of Boris 
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Yeltzin, exert a direct impact upon the situation of Kaliningrad. The establishment of seven 
Federal Districts (Kaliningrad belongs to the North-Western Federal District with its capital in 
St. Petersburg) reinforces central control over the regions and reduces the scope of autonomy 
for the governors. This mechanism is already visible in the case of Kaliningrad. 
One of the important causes of Moscow's unwillingness to accept a more self-directed 
development of the Kaliningrad enclave will be fear of the potential disintegration of the 
Russian federation, as has been the case over the past decade. It should be expected that 
the policy of the Putin administration concerning enclave relations with the EU will 
correspond to the provision contained in the medium term Strategy for the Development 
of Relations of the Russian Federation with the EU, adopted in 1999. The authors of that 
Strategy clearly underline the necessity to assure the full authority of Moscow over 
Kaliningrad, adding only that the District could, to such an extent as may be feasible, 
fulfil the role of a pilot region in the relations between Russia and the EU. 
 
4. The Significance of Personal Arrangements 
Contrary to the EU practice of attaching key importance to institutions in politics, Russian 
politics affords a much greater importance to the personality of the particular politician. 
With respect to the situation Kaliningrad one cannot overlook this phenomenon which is of 
key significance in Russian political life. A good illustration of that principle is given when 
one compares the regional standpoints of Yeltzin and Putin. Yeltzin symbolised of the 
weakness of the centre in relation to the power-accumulating regions. Conversely, Putin 
personifies the drive to strengthen the centre at the expense of the regions. The Russian 
president needs in fact to reckon with the provision of the law only to a small degree, as he is 
able to modify them in whatever way he pleases. 
The personality of the politician also has a bearing on the local level. In the case of the 
Kaliningrad enclave, its previous governor, Leonid Gorbienko, was reluctant to develop 
international contacts, and especially with foreign capital. He failed to exploit the 
opportunities presented by a weak centre during Yeltzin's reign, and particularly during his 
second presidential term of office. The prevailing opinion in Kaliningrad is that the years 
1997-2000, under Gorbienko, were wasted years. 
The new governor – Admiral Yegorov – is perceived as the loyal executor of Putin's 
orders. Based on the Yegorov's behaviour so far he may be expected to welcome 
improved foreign relations, including those with the EU. Perhaps greater than those 
limitations imposed on him by the centre, it will be the remnants of a soviet mentality 
which will have a greater bearing on his leaning toward moderate conservatism. For 
example, the new governor opposed the introduction of the private ownership of land, 
which will prove a decisive impediment to foreign investment in that enclave.  
When one assesses the chances for the development of relations between the EU and the 
Kaliningrad one must consider the Putin-Yegorov personal relationship, which will most 
probably exist for the next 7-8 years. This implies that they will decide on the nature of 
Kaliningrad-EU relations even after the latter's embracement of Poland and Lithuania. 
 
 
II. Proposed Actions 
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1. The Kaliningrad as Part of a New Friendly Neighbourhood Area 
With EU enlargement to the East, the existing friendly neighbourhood area, which in the 
nineties consisted of the Central European candidate countries, will disappear. For the first 
time after the cold war period, the EU will be exposed on a great scale to an area essentially 
different in economic, political and social terms. The Finnish concept of the Northern 
Dimension, which has already become part of the official policy of the EU, should be 
regarded as an attempt to overcome the unfavourable tendencies resulting from the disparities 
between the EU and those Russian regions already sharing borders with the Union. Its impact 
also covers the Kaliningrad. 
In the future, after EU enlargement to the East, the Northern Dimension should become 
a component part of the Union’s policy with respect to those countries not forming part 
of the Union, but rather neighbouring it. The objective of such a policy would involve of 
the creation of a new friendly neighbourhood area. 
The main features of friendly neighbourhood should include the following: 
!"Measures facilitating the free movement of people with the EU. 
!"Greater EU assistance to the present candidate countries of Central Europe. The existing 
TACIS programme covering, i.a. Russia, will be insufficient under the new political 
realities following the enlargement of the EU to the East. 
!"Facilitation of trade. 
In the case of Russia, as a country the size of a continent, the friendly neighbourhood area 
would include only those regions directly neighbouring the enlarged EU. The Kaliningrad, 
owing to its nature of an enclave inside the Union, should be treated as a special case. The 
facilitating measures for the Kaliningrad enclave, however, cannot be treated as a price for the 
accession of Poland and Lithuania to the EU. 
One should, above all, maintain the existing arrangements enabling the inhabitants of 
the Kaliningrad to travel relatively freely to neighbouring countries – Poland and 
Lithuania, and moreover to enable easier visa access to facilitate travel to all of the 
Schengen convention countries. 
The issue of the freedom of movement is of essential significance for the future of 
Kaliningrad. The possibility of forging relations with the outside world has, over the past ten-
year period, become one of the greatest gains enjoyed by the inhabitants of the Kaliningrad 
enclave. As a rule, the issue of cross-border regulations with a future European Union 
including Lithuania and Poland is the first subject raised by the representatives of the 
authorities of Kaliningrad and the business community at meetings with their Polish or 
Lithuanian equivalents. 
Solutions may be looked for in the framework of two possible models: 
!"Traffic without visas – The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is in favour of the 
continuation of the currently binding regulations applied at present by Lithuania vis-à-vis 
Kaliningrad inhabitants: the ability of Kaliningrad residents to stay on Lithuanian territory 
for 30 days per year (whereas Russian citizens resident in other regions of Russia need a 
visa in order to enter the territory of that country). In the future, apart from Lithuania, 
such an arrangement could also be applied by Poland. Assuming, of course, that the EU 
would accept that. 
!"More easily obtainable visas – A decisive move would be to introduce free-of-charge 
visas to enter the countries of the Schengen area for residents of the Kaliningrad, and to 
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sharpen up the bureaucratic procedure of granting them. Such a policy runs parallel with 
the need to develop a network of consulates for EU member states in Kaliningrad. (Poland 
and Lithuania already have diplomatic representation offices in the region.) 
In the EU, both in the European Commission and in some of the member countries, especially 
Scandinavia and Germany, the proposition to introduce measures facilitating travel to the 
Union for the residents of the Kaliningrad enclave is being raised. Within the not too distant 
future it would advisable to present a specific solution of that issue to the EU. If the Union 
were to propose such a solution, Poland and Lithuania would not be forced to introduce the 
requirement of visas for the inhabitants of the enclave in compliance with the acquis of 
Schengen. 
The Polish government has already announced the intention to introduce the requirement of 
visas for all Russian citizens from the autumn of 2001. 
 
2. The Necessity to Act Flexibly 
In relations with Russia over the Kaliningrad the Union must reckon with the possibility of 
sudden U-turns in the policies of Moscow. Such might exert a negative impact upon the 
hitherto accomplishments of EU-Kaliningrad co-operation. 
Union co-operation with Kaliningrad should be conducted, above all, via the regions, 
and not through the central authorities of the Union or the member states. By assigning 
the relations to the local level, Russian concerns about  EU intentions to subordinate this 
Russian region directly to itself should be assuaged. Of course, immediate neighbours 
will be naturally inclined to co-operate with Kaliningrad: Lithuanian local self-
government authorities, and self-governing voivodeships (provinces) in Poland, which 
now have a larger scope for their activities following administrative reforms. 
Two voivodeships neighbouring Kaliningrad in question: Warmia-Mazury and Pomerania are 
interested in co-operating with the enclave. This is indicated, for instance, by the drafting of a 
new agreement between the self-governing authorities of the said voivodeships and the 
administration of the Kaliningrad (the respective documents are to be signed in the immediate 
future after the election of new governors on the Polish side). Apart from direct neighbours, a 
large part may be played by the local self-governments of the Scandinavian countries and the 
powerful German Länder.  
There ought to be as few direct contacts between Brussels and Kaliningrad as possible. In 
Russia such relations will certainly be interpreted as an attempt to elevate Kaliningrad to the 
rank of a subject in international politics. Although EU intentions might be otherwise, 
persuading Moscow of any good intentions would not be realistic. 
These issues which cannot be resolved at the local level should be tackled on the 
Brussels-Moscow stage. A typical example of such a solution may consist of personal 
traffic regulations. It would be beneficial to sign an EU-Russian framework document 
concerning the Kaliningrad. Such an agreement would offer assurances to Moscow that 
the EU does not intend in any way whatsoever to question its authority over that 
enclave. 
The local authorities, back in Kaliningrad, are also interested in the establishment of a new 
framework agreement, as this would facilitate relations with Moscow on matters concerning 
EU-Kaliningrad relations. 
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3. Asymmetrical Nature of the Co-operation 
The co-operation between the European Union and the Kaliningrad will always be of an 
asymmetrical nature, consisting of a greater commitment on the part of the EU than 
Russia. Such a paradoxical situation has to be accepted as natural. In this field one 
should not expect any spectacular successes in the next 5-8 years. This lack of 
achievement should not, under any circumstances, lead to a discernible decrease in EU 
commitment in the issue of the Kaliningrad enclave. 
Some part of the EU investment aid to Kaliningrad could be supported by Russia on special 
terms, e.g. by writing off a part of Russian debts to EU states. Given such a solution, the 
states of the Union would need to conclude a special agreement among themselves 
concerning that issue. 
Co-operation, albeit asymmetrical, enhances the growth of security in the Baltic region. The 
assurance of security in the neighbourhood comes with a price. 
 
4. Inclusion of Kaliningrad in the European Circulatory System 
The basic plan, partly feasible over the next decade, would consist of the inclusion of the 
Kaliningrad enclave in the European circulatory system. Such a process would be conducted 
to a large extent on the basis of funding from the European Union. 
Such a plan would not imply opposition to improving Kaliningrad links with other regions of 
Russia or with Belarus. The process of inclusion in the European system would only balance 
the ties of Kaliningrad with the East, and would enable the preparation of Kaliningrad to fulfil 
the role of a true Russian window to a united Europe. 
The most important tasks would include help for ecological progress within the enclave: 
co-financing the construction of sewage treatment plants, the reclamation of land from 
military bases, the reduction of toxic emissions into the atmosphere. An equally 
important issue would include the development of a modern infrastructure in the region, 
and especially the so called Via Hanseatica connecting Riga with Gdańsk via 
Kaliningrad, harbours, including passenger terminals, and bringing up the airport in 
Kaliningrad to European standards. 
Improvements in the above areas would clear the way for the development of tourist services, 
even if on a modest scale. Even a modest growth of that sector of the economy would 
generate tangible profits and contribute to the further opening up of Kaliningrad to the world. 
A similar role could be fulfilled by appealing to a part of the North-South transit traffic to 
take the Via Hanseatica route. 
It would be important to develop a pro-European elite, especially among the younger 
generation of the inhabitants of that enclave. It would be worthwhile, therefore, to invest 
in the development of an Euro-faculty at the local university. The Euro-faculty could be 
of more than just local significance. It could also train specialists in the field of 
European issues for the whole of Russia. An important aspect of the formation of the 
local pro-European elite would consist of the promotion of NGOs operating in 
Kaliningrad, which would contribute to the development of civic society oriented 
attitudes. A significant role in this could be played by Polish NGOs, which have been 
involved in supporting various social and cultural initiatives in that region since the 
early nineties. 
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The tightening of links with the enclave would also be important for the border regions of 
Poland and Lithuania. Co-operation with that region of Russia may provide a development 
opportunity for them. In the case of Lithuania, for the whole country. The Kaliningrad with its 
close to one million inhabitants is an important trading partner for Lithuania, whose 
population numbers just under 4 million. In the case of Poland, it is significant above all for 
the Warmia-Mazury, which is one of the poorest regions of Poland. 
All the activities leading to the inclusion of the Kaliningrad enclave in the European 
circulatory system would contribute toward preventing the sudden increase of the 
disproportionate gap between the Kaliningrad and its direct neighbours, who will find 
themselves in the EU. 
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